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Abstract
When a risky decision involves both skill and chance, success or failure is a signal of the decision maker’s
skill. Adopting standard models from the career concerns literature, we show that a rational desire to avoid
looking unskilled may help explain several anomalies associated with prospect theory, including probability
weighting, loss aversion, and framing. Prospect theory’s four-fold pattern of probability weighting predicts
that decision makers favor long-shots, avoid near sure-things, buy insurance against unlikely losses, and
take risky chances to win back large losses. We ﬁnd that this pattern emerges because winning a gamble
with a low probability of success is a strong signal of skill, while losing a gamble with a high probability
o fs u c c e s si sas t r o n gs i g n a lo fi n c o m p e t e n c e .R e g a r d i n gl o s sa v e r s i o n ,af e a ro fl o o k i n gi n e p tp r o v i d e sa n
alternative explanation for the puzzle of why people are so risk averse for small gambles. Such behavior
can arise because losing any gamble, even a “friendly bet” with little or no money at stake, reﬂects poorly
on the decision maker’s skill. Finally, we ﬁnd that framing aﬀects choices because diﬀerent formulations of
a question provide diﬀerent information about how a decision maker’s actions will be interpreted. While
the theoretical predictions of skill signaling closely parallel those of prospect theory, they diﬀer in some
cases, allowing for tests between the theories. The theoretical predictions are also closely related to, but
distinguishable from, those of regret theory.
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Most risky decisions involve both skill and chance. Success is therefore doubly lucky in that it brings both
material gain and an enhanced reputation for skill, while failure is doubly unlucky. In many cases the gain
or loss from looking skilled or unskilled can be signiﬁcant. For instance, the manager of a successful project
might win the conﬁd e n c eo fh e rb o s st oo v e r s e em o r ep r o j e c t s ,w h i l et h em a n a g e ro faf a i l e dp r o j e c tm i g h tb e
viewed as incompetent and lose future opportunities. More generally, it is diﬃcult to imagine a risky decision
of any consequence where a person is not concerned that failure will reﬂect unfavorably on them.
We are interested in what anomalies are predicted if people are afraid of looking unskilled, but they are
modelled as only concerned with the immediate monetary payoﬀ. We will show that, in many cases, the result
is a set of behaviors that are typically explained by the psychological theory of prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In other cases the predicted behaviors diverge, thereby
providing a basis for testing the relative explanatory power of the theories. We will also show that the
predicted behaviors are closely related to, but distinguishable from, those of regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes
and Sugden, 1982).
Economists have long recognized that actual behavior in risky environments diﬀers substantially from
standard economic models. Prospect theory’s concepts of probability weighting, loss aversion, and framing
provide a common structure for organizing many of these anomalies. Probability weighting argues that decision
makers do not weight probabilities linearly as expected utility theory requires but instead overweight low
probabilities. The theory has been used to gain insight into a range of anomalous behavior that has long
puzzled economists, including the simultaneous purchase of lottery tickets and insurance (Friedman and Savage,
1948), the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953), and the preference for long shots in horse races and other gambling
environments (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988). Loss aversion argues that utility depends on gains and losses relative
to the status quo and that utility falls more steeply in losses than it rises in gains.1 It is used to explain why
people appear so risk averse for small gambles when standard models predict near risk neutrality (Rabin and
Thaler, 2001). Finally, framing is used to explain why seemingly irrelevant rephrasing of a situation leads to
diﬀerent choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
To model the idea that people do not want to look like a “loser” and to gain insight into the relationship
between skill signaling2 and behavioral anomalies, we borrow heavily from the principle-agent literature on
career concerns starting with Holmstrom (1982/1999). This literature shows how decisions by managers aﬀect
estimates of their skill and analyzes the resulting impact on managerial behavior and contract design. We diﬀer
from the literature in that we do not explicitly model the details of the career environment, but rather derive
general results for situations where individuals, for narrow career concerns or more general considerations, care
1Prospect theory also argues that the utility function (or “value function”) is concave in gains and convex in losses (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). We follow Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1999) in emphasizing probability weights as the basis
for observed behavior in gambles involving gains or losses.
2Our use of the term captures actions to prove one’s type as in the signaling literature (Spence, 1973) and actions to hide
one’s type as in the signal-jamming literature (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986).
1about what other people think of their abilities.3 In particular, we derive results for the case where people
are “embarrassment averse” in that they are afraid of being perceived as unskilled in the same pattern as is
normally assumed for risk aversion regarding monetary outcomes.4
Following the career concerns literature, we investigate two types of skill. First, with “performance skill”
some decision makers face better odds of success than less skilled decision makers. For instance, a project
might be more likely to succeed under a skilled manager. Interest in a reputation for performance skill has
been used by Holmstrom (1982/1999) to understand “rat race” career incentives, by Holmstrom and Costa
(1986) to analyze excessive risk-taking, and by Zwiebel (1995) to analyze corporate conformism. Second,
with “evaluation skill” some decision makers are better at identifying the exact odds of a gamble than their
less skilled counterparts. For instance, a skilled manager might be better at choosing promising projects,
or a skilled broker might have a talent for identifying proﬁtable companies. Evaluation skill has been used
by Holmstrom (1982/1999) to understand distorted investment decisions, by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) to
understand herding behavior, by Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut (1989) to analyze the sunk cost fallacy,
by Prendergast and Stole (1996) to analyze both conservatism and overconﬁdence, and by Morris (2001) to
analyze political correctness.
We ﬁnd that the presence of either type of skill in a gamble can induce the three behaviors associated with
prospect theory. For probability weighting, the key is that losing a low probability gamble is less embarrassing
than losing a high probability gamble. When the odds of success are poor, failure is common but only slightly
reduces the perceived skillfulness of the decision maker because both skilled and unskilled decision makers are
expected to fail. But when success is likely, failure is rare but far more embarrassing because a person who
fails is probably unskilled. Embarrassment averse decision makers are therefore more willing to take a chance
on gambles that observers recognize are long shots, and reluctant to take gambles where success is expected.5
For loss aversion, the main result is that losing any gamble is embarrassing so losing involves a discontinuous
drop in utility even if no money is at stake. Embarrassment averse people are therefore more afraid of small
gambles than pure risk aversion regarding monetary payoﬀs would predict. For framing, in many situations
there are multiple equilibria depending on how the choice to gamble or not gamble is interpreted. The framing
of the question can determine what inferences a decision maker should make about observer beliefs and thereby
aﬀect which equilibrium is chosen.
These results are sensitive to the information environment, thereby providing an opportunity to distinguish
3We assume that fear of failure is entirely driven by a concern for not looking incompetent to outsiders. Neilson (2002)
examines behavior when utility is aﬀected directly by success or failure and ﬁnds similar results to ours.
4Of course, other cases are also of potential interest. For instance, in a career concerns environment, the gains from standing
out suﬃciently to earn a promotion might sometimes outweigh the risks of demotion. Embarrassment aversion does not ﬁts u c h
situations, just as risk aversion with respect to monetary outcomes does not ﬁt situations where consumers are willing to take a
chance to attain suﬃcient funds to buy an expensive, indivisible good.
5These results are related to the social psychology literature starting with Atkinson (1957) that examines behavior when people
both hope for success and fear failure. The literature recognizes that there is little embarrassment in failing at a diﬃcult task
and ﬁnds that failure averse people tend to pick either very diﬃcult tasks or tasks where success is nearly assured (McClelland,
1985). Our formal analysis conﬁrms the insight regarding diﬃcult tasks but also highlights the danger of failing at easy tasks.
2them from prospect theory. For probability weighting, the results are reversed if the observer does not know
the odds of the gamble. For instance, a boss might not know whether a subordinate’s project is likely to
succeed or not. In this case a project with a low probability of success clearly oﬀers more opportunity for
embarrassment than a project with a high probability of success. For loss aversion, the results are sensitive to
the information environment because refusal to take a gamble can in some cases be perceived as an admission
that one is unskilled. Rather than conﬁrming their incompetence through refusing the gamble, people may
take the gamble in the hope of getting lucky and escaping embarrassment. Hence people are not necessarily
loss averse but can be “dared” into taking unproﬁtable gambles. For framing, in some situations there are
multiple equilibria in which framing is important, while in other situations there is only one equilibrium so
f r a m i n gs h o u l dh a v en oe ﬀect.
To understand these results further, ﬁrst consider probability weighting. In both its original form (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979) and in its later form of “cumulative prospect theory” (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992),6 probability weighting argues that people typically violate expected utility maximization by not weight-
ing probabilities linearly. In particular there is a “four-fold pattern” with overweighting of small probability
gains (such as taking a 10% chance of winning $100 over $10 for sure), underweighting of high probability
gains (such as taking $90 for sure rather than a 90% chance of winning $100), overweighting of low probability
losses (such as paying $10 for sure rather than risking a 10% chance of losing $100), and underweighting of
high probability losses (such as taking a 90% chance of losing $100 rather than paying $90 for sure). This
pattern corresponds to favoring long-shots, avoiding near sure-things, buying insurance against unlikely losses,
and taking risky chances to win back large losses.
From the perspective of skill signaling the rather complicated four-fold pattern in gains and losses can
be interpreted more simply as just overweighting of small probabilities of success and underweighting of high
probabilities of success. In particular, favoring long shots and taking chances to win back large losses are
both cases of overweighting small probabilities of success, and avoiding near sure things and buying insurance
are both cases of underweighting of high probability of success. Therefore when skill signaling predicts that
decision makers favor gambles with a low probability of success and avoid gambles with a high probability of
success, the four fold pattern is predicted.
Figure 1 shows a probability weighting function that corresponds to the four-fold pattern. In the prospect
theory literature there are typically two such lines of nearly identical shape and position, one for the weighting
function where p is the chance of winning a positive amount and one for the weighting function where p is the
chance of losing a negative amount.7 The close similarity of the probability weighting functions in gains and
6Cumulative prospect theory is an elaboration of prospect theory based on rank-dependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1982).
Cumulative prospect theory can more logically incorporate gambles where there are more than two outcomes, but we restrict
attention in this paper to gambles with only two outcomes so the theories give identical predictions.
7The original formulation of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) included a discontinuity at p =1t oc a p t u r et h e
“certainty eﬀect” that a lottery with a near 100% chance of winning some amount is valued substantially below winning that
amount for certain. Such an eﬀect arises from simpler strategic considerations than examined here. Whereas a promise of certain
gains can be pursued in court (of either the legal or public opinion kind), there is little recourse against apparent fraud if the
3Figure 1: Prospect theory’s probability weighting function
losses — the source of the four-fold pattern — is referred to as the “reﬂection eﬀect”. However, as discussed
above, from the perspective of skill signaling the four fold-pattern only requires overweighting of gambles with
a low probability of success and underweighting of gambles with a high probability of success, so in Figure 1
we interpret p as simply the probability of success.
Probability weights cannot be observed directly, but if the utility function is known to have a particular
form then probability weights can be inferred from the observable risk premia that people pay to avoid
gambles.8 The simplest approach is to assume that utility is linear in wealth since standard theories indicate
that the utility function should be nearly linear for all but very large gambles (Pratt, 1964). If a person
has the probability weighting function shown in Figure 1, a gamble with a p = .9 probability of winning is
weighted as if the gamble really has about a p = .8 probability of winning. For instance, the person is nearly
indiﬀerent to a gamble with a 90% chance of winning $100 and getting $80 for sure, i.e. the gamble has a $10
risk premium. In contrast a gamble with a p = .1 probability of winning is weighted as if the gamble really
has about a p = .2 probability of winning. For instance, the person is nearly indiﬀerent to a gamble with a
10% chance winning $100 and winning $20 for sure, i.e. the gamble has a negative $ 1 0r i s kp r e m i u m . S ot h e
clearest testable prediction of prospect theory’s probability weighting function is that risk premia are negative
for gambles with low probabilities of success and positive for gambles with high probabilities of success. When
gains are advertised as probabilistic. Fear of being cheated may also be a factor in the related phenomenon of consumer aversion
to “probabilistic insurance” in which compensation is not paid with certainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
8Even if the shape of the utility function is not known, it is still possible to test the general shape of the probability weighting
function (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996).
4this pattern holds we will say that the four-fold pattern is strongly satisﬁed. When the risk premium for
gambles with a low probability of success is smaller — but not actually negative — we will say the four-fold
pattern is only weakly satisﬁed.
First consider the connection between probability weighting and performance skill in which some decision
makers are better at a given gamble than others. Because they oﬀer less risk of embarrassment, we ﬁnd that
gambles with a low probability of success always have smaller risk premia than gambles with a high probability
of success, so the four-fold pattern is always at least weakly satisﬁed. For the case where decision makers do
not know their own skill, risk premia are always positive for any gamble so only weak satisfaction of the four
fold pattern is possible. However, when decision makers know their own skill they may feel compelled to take
gambles with negative risk premia to show that they are not trying to hide a relative lack of skill. Depending
on how unfavorably they expect that refusing a gamble will be viewed, the four-fold pattern may be satisﬁed
either weakly or strongly.
The situation is similar for evaluation skill in which some decision makers are better than others at
identifying the exact odds of a gamble. Low probability gambles again have smaller risk premia than high
probability gambles. Whether the four-fold pattern is satisﬁed weakly or strongly depends on whether the
observer learns the outcome of a gamble that is not taken. If the observer does not learn the outcome then
the four-fold pattern holds only weakly. But if the outcome of a gamble is observable even when the decision
maker turns it down, the decision maker cannot simply refuse to take the gamble and prevent the observer from
learning about her skill. If such a gamble is not taken, a good outcome is a strong indication that the decision
maker failed to recognize the gamble had better than expected odds. We ﬁnd that for low probability gambles
this possibility is more embarrassing than taking the gamble and losing, so the risk premium is negative. The
opposite situation arises with high probability gambles. If such a gamble is not taken, little about the decision
maker’s skill is revealed because the good outcome is likely regardless of whether the gamble’s true odds were
slightly better or worse than expected. The danger from taking the gamble and losing is greater, so high
probability gambles have positive risk premia.
Our results on probability weighting hold for the case where the decision maker’s utility function is de-
creasingly concave in the observer’s skill estimate. This restriction has a natural interpretation based on the
standard assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion in monetary outcomes. If, for instance, future earn-
ings are a linear function of observer skill estimates, then it immediately follows from decreasing absolute risk
aversion that the utility function is decreasingly concave in the observer’s skill estimate.9 If being perceived
as incompetent is disproportionately damaging to a person’s status and opportunities, ﬁnancial or otherwise,
then decreasing concavity is even more relevant.10




/(u0)2 < 0. If u0 > 0a n du00 < 0, this requires u000 > 0, which is the deﬁnition of decreasing concavity. Standard
utility functions used in economics, such as the exponential, logarithmic, and constant relative risk aversion utility functions, all
satisfy u000 > 0. Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that the demand for risky assets increases with wealth (Pratt, 1964)
and that consumers engage in precautionary savings (Kimball, 1990).
10For instance, the structure of competition between managers may induce a strong fear of failure (Milbourn, Shockley, and
5Regarding loss aversion, prospect theory argues that a loss is substantially more painful than a gain of
equal size independent of the decision maker’s wealth level. Whereas standard models of risk aversion assume
that the ﬁrst derivative of the utility function is continuous, prospect theory argues that the utility function
(or “value function”) has a kink at current wealth, with a steeper slope downwards than upwards. Therefore,
the standard result that decision makers should be almost risk neutral for gambles with very small stakes
(Pratt, 1964) does not apply. The most direct prediction of loss aversion is that gambles with an equal chance
of winning or losing have a non-trivial risk premium even when the monetary stakes are very small.11 Rabin
and Thaler (2001) show that loss aversion may explain the puzzle that common estimates of risk aversion for
small gambles imply implausibly high risk premiums for large gambles (Schlaifer, 1969; Rabin, 2000).
Skill signaling implies a similar result for the basic models of performance skill and evaluation skill since
decision makers have a strong dislike of being seen as a loser regardless of their wealth. Small gambles, even
“friendly bets” with no money, aﬀect estimated skill so there is a discontinuous jump in utility from winning
and a discontinuous drop from losing.12 If the decision maker is risk averse with respect to skill estimates
then, consistent with loss aversion, the drop is larger.13
While loss aversion appears to be a common phenomenon, there are also situations where people are more
risk taking than loss aversion would predict. For instance, youth are particularly prone to daring each other to
risky behavior14 and entrepreneurs often show costly overconﬁdence.15 For performance skill, this can happen
when the decision maker knows her own skill and not taking a chance is perceived as a lack of conﬁdence
in one’s abilities.16 Gambles with equal probability of success or failure might then be accepted rather than
rejected. For evaluation skill, loss aversion is not a factor when the outcome of the gamble is observed even if
the decision maker does not take it. Because the decision maker will be judged by the outcome whether she
gambles or not, she is indiﬀerent between gambles with an equal probability of success or failure.
Finally, consider the connection between skill signaling and framing. In many situations seemingly irrel-
Thakor, 1999).
11Loss aversion may also be related to the endowment eﬀect (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). The role of signaling
in the endowment eﬀect is discussed in Posner and Fremling (1999) and the roll of bargaining with asymmetric information is
analyzed in Dupont and Lee (2002). Plott and Zeiler (2003) ﬁnd that the endowment eﬀect disappears when anonymity is
ensured, bargaining factors are eliminated, and likely sources of subject confusion are controlled for.
12This is consistent with Schlaifer’s (p.161) suggestion that in some cases “nonmonetary consequences” of losing may explain
high risk premia for small gambles.
13Just as a wealthy person is relatively unaﬀected by small monetary losses, it may seem that a person with a very strong
reputation for skill should be relatively unaﬀected by losing. Accumulated savings can be used as a perfect substitute for any
monetary losses, but an accumulated reputation for skill cannot fully cushion the embarrassment of losing. Skill changes with
time so new information is always more important than old informa t i o n ,s k i l li nag i v e nt a s ki su n l i k e l yt ob eap e r f e c ts u b s t i t u t e
for skill in another task, and full information on a decision maker’s previous successes is unlikely to be available to any given
audience.
14See O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000) for a discussion of other factors in youth risk taking.
15In an experiment Camerer and Lovallo (1999) ﬁnd that excess entry by subjects playing the role of entrepreneurs is larger
when the subjects know that payoﬀs depend on skill.
16Of course, in some cases trying too hard to prove one’s skill can itself signal a lack of conﬁdence (Feltovich, Harbaugh, and
To, 2002). In the simple model we consider this possibility does not arise.
6evant rephrasings of a question leads to diﬀerent choices. In particular, the decision to gamble or not often
depends on whether the outcomes are described as gains or losses, even though the actual outcomes are the
same. Consider the classic ﬂu problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In two materially identical formu-
lations a choice is made about the fates of 600 people. Some subjects are given the choices (A) 200 people
will be saved or (B) with a 1
3 probability 600 people will be saved and with a 2
3 probability no people will be
saved. Most of the subjects choose (A). Other subjects are given the choices (A) 400 people will die or (B)
with a 1
3 probability no people will die and with a 2
3 probability 600 people will die. Most of the subjects
choose (B).17 The decision makers know that there are 600 lives at stake so in either formulation it is clear
that success at the gamble is 0 die and 600 live, failure is 600 die and 0 live, and not gambling is 400 die and
200 live. From a prospect theory perspective the answers change because people tend to behave diﬀerently
in the gains and losses domains. From a skill signaling perspective, the question is what is viewed as success
and what is viewed as failure. In this question do observers know what success is? Not if they just see or
hear a description of the outcome without the background information. They would reasonably conclude from
the newspaper headlines that “200 people saved” was a great success and that “400 people died” was at least
as noteworthy a failure. Choice (A) therefore oﬀers a sure bet at “success” in the ﬁrst formulation and at
“failure” in the second formulation.
Even in less extreme situations framing is still important from a skill signaling perspective. For both prob-
ability weighting and loss aversion, multiple equilibria can exist because of asymmetric information between
the decision maker and the receiver. The primary case is when, with performance skill, the decision maker
knows her skill and might feel pressured to signal her skill by gambling.18 Whether she will gamble depends
on what the observer believes about her oﬀ-equilibrium-path behavior when she is expected to take the gamble
but does not. As discussed above, these beliefs determine whether the weak or strong four-fold pattern results
and whether loss aversion or dare taking results. Diﬀerent beliefs are justiﬁable according to standard criteria
such as divinity, so beliefs are very susceptible to any extra information. The observer could explicitly state
that not taking a gamble will be interpreted as an admission of incompetence, or that nothing negative will be
inferred from such a choice. But absent such statements, the only information to fall back on is the framing
of the question.
The idea that frames often “provide information beyond their literal content” is examined empirically by
McKenzie and Nelson (2002). They ﬁnd that speakers consistently frame questions diﬀerently based on private
information so the choice of frame provides real information to decision makers. For instance, speakers are
more likely to describe a new treatment as leading to “50% of patients survive” when the standard treatment
is not very successful, and to describe a new treatment as leading to “50% of patients die” when the standard
treatment is very successful. The idea that framing can help choose between diﬀerent equilibria has been
17Note that in this example p = 1
3 so, as seen in Figure 1, the distortion from probability weighting is small. Prospect theory
can explain the reversal not by probability weighting but by the additional assumption that the value (or utility) function is
concave in gains and convex in losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
18As discussed in the text, multiple equilibria can arise in other cases too but they do not lead to qualitatively diﬀerent
predictions.
7investigated empirically in coordination games by Bohnet and Cooter (2003). They show that “framing
eﬀects” can often be interpreted as equilibrium selection. Our results regarding framing have elements of
both information leakage and equilibrium selection in that multiple equilibria arise because of asymmetric
information and framing reveals information that leads to one of the equilibria being chosen.
Table 1 summarizes the conclusions.19 Cases where changing the information environment changes the
results provide opportunities to test the comparative explanatory power of prospect theory and skill signaling.
It may seem that existing tests of prospect theory do not include a skill component so any roll for skill signaling
would be above and beyond the already identiﬁed eﬀects of prospect theory. In fact, most tests starting
with Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have asked hypothetical questions about whether diﬀerent gambles with
diﬀerent probabilities of success would be accepted or rejected. As Kahneman and Tversky state, the subjects
have no reason to lie and “people often know how they would behave in actual situations of choice”. But it
is unclear from the descriptions whether, as in almost all real world gambles, there is a skill component20 or
whether the gambles are meant to involve no skill at all. When probability weighting is tested using explicit
randomization devices which clearly have no skill component, the four-fold pattern is substantially weakened
or disappears (Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund, 2002).21
Table 1: Summary of Conclusions on Probability Weighting, Loss Aversion, and Framing








































19Note that the case where the observer does not know the probability of success is not relevant for our simple discussion of
loss aversion. Also note that we do not examine performance skill under the two diﬀerent information conditions examined for
evaluation skill and vice versa. Qualitatively diﬀerent predictions are not generated by such permutations of the information
conditions.
20Perhaps the least skill dependent gambles that one can encounter in real life are lotteries and slot machines. But even those
gambles oﬀer diﬀerent odds depending on how they are played, so evaluation skill is still present and winners are not entirely
incorrect to brag about their (relatively) clever strategies.
21Eliminating performance skill in an experiment is straightforward except for the complication that decision makers (and
observers) might have an “illusion of control” and still act as if skill is important (Langer, 1975). Eliminating evaluation skill
is more diﬃcult. For instance, the decision to participate in an experiment at all involves an evaluation by the subject that the
likely payoﬀ will be higher than the opportunity cost of time. Therefore even if gambles in an experiment have no explicit skill
component conditional on the the subject having chosen to participate in the experiment, subjects with large earnings still have
favorable information about their judgement to report to friends and family. Even conditional on participation, evaluation skill
arises regarding subject estimates that the odds really are as reported and that they really will get paid if they win.
8So far we have only discussed the connections with prospect theory. Regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes
and Sugden, 1982) is similar to skill signaling in that it oﬀers an explanation for probability weighting that
does not rely on perceptual or cognitive biases. The utility function is assumed to include not just wealth, but
an additively separable regret function that is increasing in the diﬀerence between the realized and unrealized
outcomes. A stock might be bought because of the regret that would arise if it was not purchased and did
well, and insurance might be attractive in part because of the regret that would arise if it turned out to be
needed and was not taken. In particular, regret theory can explain prospect theory’s weighting function if the
regret function is more concave for negative outcomes (the realized outcome is the worse outcome) than for
corresponding positive outcomes (the realized outcome is the better outcome).22
Regret theory leaves open the question of why decision makers experience regret. While the internal
incentive to avoid mistakes is clearly important, external incentives may be relevant also. Bell (1982) suggests
that “the evaluation of others, one’s bosses for example, may be an important consideration” but regret theory
does not formally model how success or failure should aﬀect such evaluations. By explicitly allowing for some
decision makers to be more skilled than others we are able to model this process of how skill estimates are
determined. In particular, we are able to show why losing high probability gambles is more embarrassing than
losing low probability gambles under both performance skill and evaluation skill, and to analyze the diﬀerent
equilibria that can result. While there is a strong connection between regret and skill signaling, the models
are distinct in that regret theory is driven by the relative sizes of the realized and unrealized outcomes while
skill signaling is driven by how success or failure aﬀects the observer’s updating of the decision maker’s skill.23
2P e r f o r m a n c e S k i l l
We ﬁrst consider a model where decision makers of diﬀerent skill face diﬀering probabilities of success for the
same gamble. A gamble (p,xw;1− p,xl)o ﬀers xw (“winning” or “success”) with stated probability p and xl
(“losing” or “failure”) with stated probability 1 − p where xw >x l and p ∈ (0,1). The decision maker’s type
t is skilled s or unskilled u with equal probability, t ∈ {s,u},P r [ s]=P r [ u]=1
2.24 If a gamble is stated to
have probability p of success then the actual probability is Prp[xw|s]=p + ε for the skilled decision maker
and Prp[xw|u]=p − ε for the unskilled decision maker for some ε ∈ (0,min{p,1 − p}). For all p,w ea s s u m e
ε is the same for the gamble (p,xw;1− p,xl) as it is for the gamble (1 − p,xw;p,xl). The decision maker has
22While this case is consistent with the weighting function, Loomes and Sugden (1982) consider diﬀerent cases and note “there
seems to be no ap r i o r ireason for preferring any one of these assumptions to the others”. Note that this restriction on the regret
component of the utility function is equivalent to our assumption of decreasing concavity for the skill estimate component of
the utility function. As argued, decreasing concavity for the skill estimate component is a natural assumption if future income
depends linearly on estimated skill.
23Although we do not model it here, in practice the size of the gamble is also likely to be relevant for skill reputation, though
not in the same manner as in regret theory. If the decision maker devotes more resources to evaluating or performing well at
larger gambles the observer should update the decision maker’s estimated skill more strongly based on the results of such gambles.
Such investments are analyzed in Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) and Milbourn, Shockley, and Thakor (2001).
24Assuming equal proportions simpliﬁes the analysis. The embarrassment aversion problem is less severe when most decision
makers are skilled since even those who fail are still likely to be skilled. Conversely, the problem is more severe when most decision
makers are unskilled.
9an additively separable utility function which is linear in wealth Y and increasing in the observer’s estimate
of their type given all available information,25 U = Y + v(Pr[s]). The utility function is “reduced form” in
that we do not explicitly model how skill signaling materially aﬀects the decision maker.26 We assume that
a better skill estimate helps, v0 > 0, that the decision maker is risk averse with respect to skill estimates,
v00 < 0, and that this aversion is stronger at lower estimates, v000 > 0. As indicated, this last assumption of
decreasing concavity is necessary for decreasing absolute risk aversion, a standard assumption for risk aversion
with respect to monetary outcomes.
We start by assuming that the decision maker does not know her own skill so that the act of taking a
gamble is not itself a signal to the observer. Since the decision maker does not know her type, the observer
can infer nothing about her skill from the decision to gamble or not, so the observer believes that each type
gambles with equal probability. If the gamble is taken the expected skill of a decision maker, conditioning on
























Figure 2 shows the case where ε = p(1−p)/2s ot h a ts k i l ld i ﬀerences shrink as p approaches 0 or 1. For low
probability gambles winning has a large impact on estimated skill as seen from the divergence of the top line
Prp[s|xw] from the center line representing expected skill, pPrp[s|xw]+(1−p)Pr p[s|xl], while losing has only a
small impact as seen from the closeness of the bottom line Prp[s|xl] to expected skill. Low probability gambles
therefore present a chance of standing out with little downside risk. Conversely, winning at high probability
gambles has only a small impact on estimated skill whereas losing has a large impact. Such gambles oﬀer little
opportunity to prove the sender’s skill but carry substantial danger of embarrassment.
We will ﬁrst analyze the problem from a risk premium perspective and then consider how this relates to
prospect theory. Note that the risk premium is the same for both types since they do not know their own
type. Since the utility function is linear in wealth, this common risk premium π is aﬀe c t e do n l yb yt h es k i l l
25Linearity of utility in wealth allows us to isolate the eﬀect of skill reputation. Alternative speciﬁcations, such as U =
v(Y )+v(Pr[s]) or U = v(Y +Pr[s]), capture the same intuition but complicate the calculation of risk premia. For small gambles,
wealth should be nearly linear in wealth (Pratt, 1964).
26By putting estimated skill into the utility function we do not mean to imply that people receive direct utility from being
perceived as skilled, any more than by putting wealth into the utility function do we mean to imply that people receive direct
utility from money. A reputation for skill can help people attain the status, opportunities, and goods that they desire.
10Figure 2: Performance Skill: Estimated skill from winning (top) and losing (bottom)












2 the risk premium is therefore smaller for the low probability lottery (p,xw;1− p,xl)t h a nf o rt h e
high probability lottery (1 − p,xw;p,xl)i f
pv(Pr
p [s|xw]) + (1 − p)v(Pr





Since Prp[s|xw] > Pr1−p[s|xw] > Prp[s|xl] > Pr1−p[s|xl]f o rp<1
2, the choice is between a gamble with a
small chance of a very good outcome and a large chance of a moderately bad outcome, and a gamble with a
small chance of a very bad outcome and a large chance of a moderately good outcome. The expected values
and variances are equal, but the high probability gamble has greater “downside risk” (Menezes, Geiss, and
Tressler, 1980) due to the chance of a very bad outcome. Decreasing absolute risk aversion, which v000 > 0i s
a necessary condition for, suggests that the decision maker is more risk averse at low values of Pr[s], so the
downside risk is particularly important.
The eﬀect of downside risk on expected utility is seen in Figure 3 for a constant relative risk aversion
function v(Pr[s]) = Pr[s]1−a/(1 − a) with the CRRA parameter set at a =5 . 27 Skill estimates from winning
and losing for a fair p = 1
4 lottery (ﬂatter line) and a fair p = 3
4 lottery (steeper line) are the same as in Figure
27This value is chosen for graphical convenience. Estimates of relative risk aversion for wealth, which might be confounded by
embarrassment concerns and other factors, vary widely.
11Figure 3: Performance Skill: Utility from high (p = 3
4)a n dl o w( p = 1
4) probability gambles
2. In each case estimated skill is 1
2 on average, but the downside risk is clearly much higher for the p = 3
4
gamble. Since the line for the p = 1
4 gamble is higher at the average estimated skill of 1
2,i to ﬀers higher utility.
This would not be true if the utility function dipped less sharply for lower values of Pr[s], implying greater
tolerance of risk. As the ﬁrst part of the following proposition shows, our assumption of decreasing concavity
of v implies the lower probability lottery is preferred. Constant relative risk aversion for a risk averse decision
maker requires v000 > 0, so in this example the lower probability lottery is always preferred. The second part
of the proposition shows that the risk premium is always positive for any p. T h i si sa l s oa p p a r e n tf r o mF i g u r e
3.
Proposition 1 With performance skill when the decision maker is uninformed: (i) for all p ∈ (0, 1
2),t h el o w -
probability gamble (p,xw;1−p,xl) has a smaller risk premium than the high probability gamble (1−p,xw;p,xl);
and (ii) for all p ∈ (0,1),t h eg a m b l e(p,xw;1− p,xl) has a positive risk premium.
Proof: (i) Third-degree stochastic dominance (Whitmore, 1970) implies that, for v0 > 0, v00 < 0, v000 > 0, a
gamble with distribution F(z)o n[ 0 ,1] is preferred to a gamble with distribution G(z)o n[ 0 ,1] if





G(z) − F(z)dzdy ≥ 0( 6 )
for all x ∈ [0,1]. Let F(z) be the distribution of the estimated skill for the low probability lottery (p,xw;1−
p,xl)a n dG(z) be the distribution of estimated skill for the high probability lottery (1 − p,xw;p,xl), so
12F(z)=0 f o rz<Prp[s|xl]
F(z)=1− p for Prp[s|xl] ≤ z<Prp[s|xw]
F(z)=1 f o rz ≥ Prp[s|xw]
(7)
and
G(z)=0 f o rz<Pr1−p[s|xl]
G(z)=p for Pr1−p[s|xl] ≤ z<Pr1−p[s|xw]
G(z)=1 f o rz ≥ Pr1−p[s|xw].
(8)
Therefore the distribution of skill estimates for the low probability gamble is preferred if (5) holds, or,
pPr
p [s|xw]+( 1− p)Pr
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Condition (9) holds with equality since the expected skill is 1




1−p ≥ 0, which holds strictly, and the last two conditions hold with equality.
(ii) Since pPrp[s|xw]+( 1− p)Pr p[s|xl]=1
2, the premium π(p)i n( 3 )i sp o s i t i v ef o rv00 < 0. ¥
The results on risk premia can be related to the probability weighting function by ﬁnding the diﬀerent
certainty equivalents c for diﬀerent values of p in the gamble (p,xw;1−p,xl) and then inferring what probability
w of winning would have induced a risk neutral decision maker unconcerned with skill signaling (or other






In our model with embarrassment aversion but without probability weighting (i.e. w(p)=p) the certainty
equivalent is just c(p)=pxw +( 1− p)xl − π(p). So if an experimenter estimates the probability weighting
28Rather than asking for the certainty equivalent directly, the decision maker can be oﬀered a range of diﬀerent gambles and
the probability weights can then be inferred from these choices. Asking for certainty equivalents forces, or attempts to force, the
decision maker to reveal more information about her skill than is revealed by just accepting or rejecting a given gamble. And
multiple gambles provide more information about skill than the single gamble analyzed here.
13function assuming no concern for skill signaling, but the true utility function is U = Y + v(Pr[s]) without





Note that the experimenter will ﬁnd overweighting if the risk premium is negative and underweighting if it is
positive. Moreover, the amount of overweighting or underweighting is in direct proportion to the risk premium.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 therefore implies that there will be disproportionate weight on low probabilities
relative to high probabilities, which is consistent with prospect theory. However, from the second part of the
proposition the risk premium is always positive so even low probabilities will still appear to be underweighted
rather than overweighted as assumed by prospect theory. Therefore the four-fold pattern is satisﬁed weakly
rather than strongly. The second part of the proposition also implies that for gambles with equal chances of
winning or losing, p = 1
2, the risk premium is positive. If an experimenter does not control for skill signaling,
this behavior will appear as loss aversion.
We now consider the asymmetric information case where the decision maker knows whether she is skilled
or unskilled. Choosing to gamble or not can then become a signal of the decision maker’s private information
about her type. The three pure strategy equilibria that can exist are a both-gamble pooling equilibrium, a
neither-gamble pooling equilibrium, and a separating equilibrium where skilled decision makers gamble and
unskilled decision makers do not. Note that if skill signaling is important the neither-gamble and separating
equilibria are diﬃcult to support.29
Since the neither-gamble equilibrium provides no information on decision maker type, while the separating
equilibrium provides complete information, the both-gamble equilibrium is most important for understanding
the relationship between skill signaling and probability weighting. In the both-gamble equilibrium the observer
believes that both types gamble and, given these beliefs, both types choose to gamble. Therefore if the gamble
is taken the expected skill of a decision maker conditioning on winning or losing for a gamble with p average
chance of winning is still Prp[s|xw]a n dP r p[s|xl] as already deﬁned. If, however, a decision maker deviates from
the equilibrium path and refuses to gamble there is no clear implication for what exactly the observer should
believe. Let µr represent the observer’s belief regarding the probability that a person who refuses a gamble
is skilled. The ﬁrst part of the following proposition shows that for a given µr, the average risk premium
for skilled and unskilled decision makers is smaller for low probability gambles, implying weak satisfaction of
the four-fold property.30,31 The second part of the proposition addresses when the four-fold property might
29In the neither-gamble equilibrium the skilled type always has stronger incentives to deviate than the unskilled type, so the
equilibrium will not survive strong reﬁnements such as D1 (Banks and Sobel, 1987) if skill signaling is an important factor for
the decision maker. Similarly, in the separating equilibrium the unskilled type is admitting she is unskilled, so if the expected
monetary loss from gambling is not too large she will deviate and mimic the skilled type.
30We consider the average premium here but the risk premium for unskilled gamblers is also of interest. Since unskilled gamblers
are the ﬁrst to deviate from the both-gamble equilibrium, the risk premium for an unskilled gambler deﬁnes how generous the
gamble has to be in order to sustain the equilibrium. Following the same steps as for the average premium it can be shown that
the risk premium necessary to sustain the both-gamble equilibrium is smaller for a low probability gamble than a high probability
gamble.
31We hold µr constant for high and low probability gambles to make the comparison. In practice observers may condition their
beliefs on who gambles based on the odds of the gamble.
14be satisﬁed strongly under reasonable beliefs. Since skilled decision makers are less likely to lose, divinity
(Cho and Kreps, 1987) makes the understandable requirement that µr < 1
2, so the question is whether such
beliefs can lead to negative risk premia for low probability gambles and positive risk premia gambles for high
probability gambles. The answer is that such beliefs always exist. The third part of the proposition addresses
loss aversion by considering gambles with an equal chance of winning or losing. Beliefs satisfying divinity
which induce either positive or negative risk premia are shown to exist. Therefore either loss aversion or dare
taking might result.
Proposition 2 With performance skill when the decision maker is informed, in the both-gamble equilibrium:
(i) for all p ∈ (0, 1
2) and µr ∈ (0,1) the average risk premium is smaller for the low-probability gamble
(p,xw;1− p,xl) than for the high-probability gamble (1 − p,xw;p,xl);( i i )f o ra n yp ∈ (0, 1
2) there exists
µr ∈ (0, 1
2) such that the average risk premium is negative for the low-probability gamble (p,xw;1− p,xl) and
positive for the high-probability gamble (1 − p,xw;p,xl); (iii) there exists µ ∈ (0, 1
2) such that the average risk
premium for the gamble (1
2,x w; 1
2,x l) is negative for µr ∈ (0,µ) and positive for µr ∈ (µ,1).































which is smaller for low p gambles than high p gambles if
pv(Pr
p [s|xw]) + (1 − p)v(Pr





for p ∈ (0, 1
2). This holds as shown in Proposition 1-i.
(ii) We are interested in µr ∈ (0, 1
2)s u c ht h a tf o rp ∈ (0, 1
2), π(p) ≤ 0 ≤ π(1 − p) or, from (17),
pv(Pr
p [s|xw]) + (1 − p)v(Pr





From (18) and the fact that π(p) ≤ 1
2,P r p[s|xw] > 0, and Prp[s|xl] > 0f o rp ∈ (0,1), such a µr exists since
v0 > 0.
(iii) From (17) and the fact that 0 < Pr 1
2[s|xw] < 1a n d0< Pr 1
2[s|xl] < 1, such a µ exists since v0 > 0. ¥
Since behavior depends on observer beliefs, multiple equilibria can result. If observers expect some groups
to try to prove their skill levels and others not to, diﬀerent behavior can result which conﬁrms the beliefs.
15For instance, it is documented that men take riskier investments than women do (Jianakopolis and Bernasek,
1998) and invest as if they are overconﬁdent (Barber and Odean, 2001). Rather than the result of underlying
diﬀerences in risk attitudes or conﬁdence between men and women, this pattern might arise from diﬀerent
equilibrium beliefs among observers about how members of each group try to prove their abilities.
The existence of multiple equilibria also allows room for framing to aﬀect decisions. In particular, if the
framing of the question leads the decision maker to expect the receiver to have a negative impression of those
who do not gamble, then risk premia will be low or even negative. This can result in the strong rather than
weak four-fold pattern, and it can result in dare taking rather than loss aversion. For instance, children and
teenagers often take risky actions as a dare to prove that they are not afraid. Even if they are not skilled
at the risky activity they may prefer to take a chance than to conﬁrm their inadequacy through refusing the
dare.32
3 Evaluation Skill
We now consider a complementary model where skilled decision makers are better at correctly inferring the
odds of a gamble than unskilled decision makers. A gamble (p,xw;1−p,xl)o ﬀers xw with average probability
p and xl with average probability 1 − p where xw >x l and p ∈ (0,1). Again the decision maker’s type is
skilled s or unskilled u with equal probability. If a lottery is stated to have probability p of success then with
equal chance the actual probability is either ph or pl where ph >p>p l. The decision maker knows the stated
probability p and receives a signal θ ∈ {H,L} of the actual probability where Pr[H|ph]=P r [ L|pl]=α for
skilled decision makers and Pr[H|ph]=P r [ L|pl]=β for unskilled decision makers and 1
2 ≤ β<α≤ 1. We
will again consider symmetric diﬀerences where ph = p + ε and pl = p − ε for some ε ∈ (0,min{p,1 − p})
and where, for all p, ε is the same for the gamble (p,xw;1− p,xl) as it is for the gamble (1 − p,xw;p,xl). As
before, the utility function is U = Y + v(Pr[s]) where v0 > 0, v00 < 0, v000 > 0.
For evaluation skill, we will restrict our attention to the case where the decision maker does not know
whether she is skilled or unskilled.33 Instead we will consider two diﬀerent cases regarding observability of
outcomes. In the ﬁrst case the observer only learns the outcome if the observer takes the gamble, and in the
second case the observer learns the outcome regardless.
Beginning with the ﬁrst case, note that if the decision maker does not condition her choice to gamble on
the signal θ, the observer learns nothing. So we restrict our attention to the separating equilibrium where a
decision maker gambles if she receives the signal H and refuses to gamble if she receives the signal L.T h e
32In some cases they may also want to signal that they have low risk aversion regardless of their skill.
33T h er e s u l t sa r en o ts i g n i ﬁcantly aﬀected if the decision maker knows her skill. Whether the decision maker has private
information about her skill is very important for performance skill because unskilled types face pressure to mimic skilled types
or be thought of as unskilled. With evaluation skill the distinction is less important because skilled decision makers do not face
better odds for a given gamble, but are better able to evaluate a given gamble. Since skilled decision makers decide whether to
take the gamble based on their private information, unskilled decision makers are not in a position to mimic them.








(αph +( 1− α)pl + βph +( 1− β)pl)
= p +( α + β − 1)ε (20)
and similarly the probability of winning with an L signal is
Pr
p [xw|L]=1− p − (α + β − 1)ε. (21)











2(p +( α + β − 1)ε)
(22)







2(1− p − (α + β − 1)ε)
(23)
if it is not.
Figure 4 shows observer skill estimates conditional on winning at the top and losing on the bottom, with
the average estimate Prp[xw|H]Pr p[s|xw,H]+P r p[xl|H]Pr p[s|xl,H]=1
2 in the middle, when ε = p(1−p)/2
as before and α =1 ,β = 1
2. As with performance skill, the downside risk under evaluation skill is clearly
increasing in p. Note that the problem is even more severe in this case because the probability of being skilled
conditional on losing drops sharply for large p.A sp increases there is both higher downside risk, as represented
by the downward shift of the two lines, and higher regular risk, as represented by the greater spread of the
lines. The spread rises with p because informed decision makers only take the gamble when θ = H so the
actual odds of the gamble winning conditional on it being taken are, on average, slightly better than p.T h i s
accentuates the likelihood that a decision maker who takes the gamble and loses is unskilled, and this eﬀect
is strongest for large p for the same reasons that losing in general is more embarrassing for large p.
B e c a u s eo fb o t ht h ei n c r e a s e dd o w n s i d er i s ka n dt h ei ncreased regular risk, gambling is particularly
unattractive for high probability gambles. The ﬁrst part of the following proposition shows that skill sig-
naling implies lower risk premia on low probability gambles than on high probability gambles.34 The second
34Note that this proof and the proof of the following proposition do not depend on the presence of regular risk as represented
by the increasing spread between estimated skill for winning and for losing. Because of this spread, the risk premium will be
strictly smaller for low p gambles even when v000 =0 .
17Figure 4: Evaluation Skill: Estimated skill from winning (top) and losing (bottom)
part of the proposition shows that the risk premia are always positive. Therefore the four-fold pattern is
satisﬁed weakly rather than strongly and there is loss aversion rather than dare taking.
Proposition 3 With evaluation skill when the outcome is observed only if the gamble is taken, in the sepa-
rating equilibrium: (i) for all p ∈ (0, 1
2) the low-probability gamble (p,xw;1− p,xl) has a smaller average risk
premium than the high-probability gamble (1 − p,xw;p,xl);( i i )f o ra l lp ∈ (0,1) the gamble (p,xw;1− p,xl)
has a positive average risk premium.
Proof: (i) First consider the case where the decision makerd o e sn o tk n o wh e rs k i l l .T h er i s kp r e m i u mf o r


























So the low probability lottery has a lower average risk premium if
pv(Pr
p [s|xw,H]) + (1 − p)v(Pr
p [s|xl,H])





18Following the same third-degree stochastic dominance argument as in Proposition 1, let F(z) be the distrib-
ution of estimated skill for the low probability lottery (p,xw;1− p,xl)a n dG(z) be the distribution for the
high probability lottery (1 − p,xw;p,xl), so
F(z)=0 f o rz<Prp[s|xl,H]
F(z)=1− p for Prp[s|xl,H] ≤ z<Prp[s|xw,H]
F(z)=1 f o rz ≥ Prp[s|xw,H]
(27)
and
G(z)=0 f o rz<Pr1−p[s|xl,H]
G(z)=p for Pr1−p[s|xl,H] ≤ z<Pr1−p[s|xw,H]




p [s|xw,H]+( 1− p)Pr










































































(α − β)(1 − 2p)
(1 − p − (α − β − 1)ε)(p − (α − β − 1)ε)
≥ 0, (33)
ε2 (α − β)(1− 2p)(α + β − 1)
(1 − p − (α − β − 1)ε)(p − (α − β − 1)ε)(1− p +( α − β − 1)ε)
≥ 0, (34)
ε2 (α − β)(1− 2p)(α + β − 1)(p +2 ( α + β − 1)ε)
(1 − p − (α − β − 1)ε)(p − (α − β − 1)ε)(1− p +( α − β − 1)ε)(p +( α − β − 1)ε)
≥ 0, (35)
all of which hold strictly for p<1
2 .
(ii) From (25) and the fact that Prp[xw|θ]Pr p[s|xw,H]+Prp[xl|θ]Pr p[s|xl,H]=1
2, this follows from v00 < 0.
¥
19We now broaden our analysis to consider the case where the outcome of a gamble is observed even when
the gamble is refused. This relates to the idea of regret theory that not taking a gamble that wins is as
frustrating as taking a gamble that loses. But from a skill signaling perspective, the key is not whether the
decision maker learns the outcome but whether the observer learns the outcome. For performance skill such
observation is irrelevant because skill is idiosyncratic so nothing can be learned about the decision maker’s
skill. But if evaluation skill is present, the success of a refused gamble reﬂects poorly on the decision maker,
and the failure of a refused gamble reﬂects well.
For the same reasons as before we are interested in the separating equilibrium where a decision maker with
an H signal gambles and a decision maker with an L signal does not. If the gamble is taken Prp[s|xw,H]a n d
Prp[s|xl,H]a r et h es a m ea sa l r e a d yd e ﬁned. If the gamble is refused the observer believes the decision maker
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2(p − (α + β − 1)ε)
(36)







2(1− p +( α + β − 1)ε)
(37)
if it is not.
Note that the skill estimate from not taking a gamble (p,xw;1−p,xl) that wins is the same as the estimate
from taking a gamble (1−p,xw;p,xl)t h a tl o s e s ,P r p[s|xw,L]=P r 1−p[s|xl,H], and that the skill estimate from
taking a gamble (p,xw;1−p,xl) that wins is the same as the estimate from not taking a gamble (1−p,xw;p,xl)
that loses, Prp[s|xw,H]=P r 1−p[s|xl,L]. Therefore the skill estimates from gambling are the same as in Figure
4, while the skill estimates from not gambling are the mirror image reﬂected around p = 1
2. The expected value
of taking the gamble or refusing it is the same, but the downside risk is much higher for refusing the gamble for
p<1
2 and for taking the gamble for p>1
2.N o t et h a tP r p[s|xw,H]−Prp[s|xl,H] < Prp[s|xl,L]−Prp[s|xw,L]
for p<1
2 and the opposite for p>1
2, so there is also greater regular risk from refusing to gamble for low p
gambles and from taking the gamble for high p gambles. As was the case in Figure 4, this asymmetry arises
because informed decision makers take the gamble when θ = H and refuse it when θ = L, implying the actual
odds of the gamble conditional on it being taken are better than the odds conditional on it being refused. To
take the gamble for high p and lose is therefore particularly embarrassing. And to refuse the gamble for low
p and have the gamble win is similarly embarrassing because the decision maker probably refused the gamble
b e c a u s eo fa ni n a c c u r a t es i g n a l .
Because of these three factors – the inability to escape an unfavorable skill estimate by refusing to gamble,
the downside risk, and the regular risk – gambling is particularly attractive for low p gambles and unattractive
20for high p gambles. The ﬁrst part of the following proposition shows that skill signaling implies behavior that
is observationally equivalent to overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities.
The second part shows that neither loss aversion nor dare taking are relevant for gambles with an equal chance
of success or failure.
Proposition 4 With evaluation skill when the outcome is observed even when the gamble is refused, in the
separating equilibrium the average risk premium of a gamble (p,xw;1−p,xl) is (i) negative for p<1
2, positive
for p>1
2, and (ii) zero for p = 1
2.
Proof: (i) Decision maker does not know her skill. In the separating equilibrium the risk premium for a


















Since Prp[xw|H]+Prp[xw|L]=2 p and Prp[xl|H]+Prp[xl|L]=2 ( 1−p), and since Prp[s|xw,L]=P r 1−p[s|xl,H]






























From Proposition 3 this is negative for p<1
2. The problem is symmetric so the average risk premium is
positive for p>1
2.
(ii) Follows directly from from (39). ¥
Since the risk premium is, on average for H and L types, negative for p ∈ (0, 1
2)a n dp o s i t i v ef o rp ∈ (1
2,1),
from a probability weighting function perspective there is overweighting for p ∈ (0, 1
2) and underweighting
for p ∈ (1
2,1). Figure 5 shows the estimated weighting functions wθ(p)=p − πθ(p)/(xw − xl)f o rt y p e s
with an H signal (top) and L signal (bottom) for a (p,10;1 − p,0) gamble where, as in previous examples,
v(x)=x1−a/(1−a), the CRRA parameter a =5 ,ε = p(1−p)/2a n dα =1 ,β = 1
2. For this case of evaluation
skill where the observer learns the outcome of a refused gamble, omission of skill signaling from the estimated
model leads to an estimated probability weighting function that closely follows that of prospect theory.
Regret theory also generates an estimated probability weighting function that is similar to prospect theory’s.
The distinguishing prediction of regret theory is that a decision maker will pay to avoid learning the outcome
of a refused gamble (Bell, 1983). We ﬁnd a similar result for skill signaling, except the decision maker prefers
to keep the observer rather than herself in the dark. Consider the case where the decision maker does not
know her skill. In the separating equilibrium if the decision maker does not gamble and the observer learns
nothing, the decision maker receives utility v(1
2). But if the observer learns the outcome, a decision maker
with signal θ receives utility Prp[xw|θ]v(Prp[s|xw,L])+Prp[xl|θ]v(Prp[s|xl,L]). Since Prp[xw|θ]Pr p[s|xw,L]+
Prp[xl|θ]Pr p[s|xl,L]=1
2, the no-observation case is preferred for v00 < 0.
21Figure 5: Evaluation Skill: Estimated probability weighting function given H and L signals
3.1 Extension: observer does not know if gamble is high or low probability
So far we have considered relatively straightforward information structures. Clearly more complicated sit-
uations are possible that are relevant for a more general understanding of skill signaling. For instance, as
suggested in the discussion of regret theory above, the decision maker might be able to choose whether to
report that a gamble is being taken. And it might be possible to not report unsuccessful gambles ex post. For
instance, people often choose whether to inform friends and associates of gambling or stock market outcomes.
If outcomes are self-reported then the absence of a report may be interpreted as a sign of failure, thereby
giving an extra incentive to take risky actions. The presence of multiple gambles also changes the information
structure substantially. Multiple gambles are important in the fallacy of large numbers (Samuelson, 1963),
the house-money eﬀect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) and the disposition eﬀect (Shefrin and Statman, 1995).
Of possible alternative information structures, of particular relevance to our analysis is the case where the
only diﬀerence from the model so far is that the observer does not know the actual odds of the gamble. For
instance a manager undertakes a project that the manager knows the diﬃculty of, but the manager’s boss is
in the dark. This problem has already been analyzed by Ross (1977) and Holmstrom (1982/1999), but it
provides a simple and straightforward way to reverse most of the predictions of skill signaling so we revisit
the problem here in order to make a clear comparison with our other results.
We consider the simplest situation where there are two possible gambles with equal chance, a low probability
gamble (p,xw;1−p,xl) and a corresponding high probability gamble (1−p,xw;p,xl)w h e r ep ∈ (0, 1
2), and the
observer does not know which gamble the decision maker faces. First consider performance skill. We examine
22the case where the decision maker does not know her true skill level.35 Even in this case multiple equilibria
can arise since the odds of the gamble are private information held by the decision maker. For the sake of
brevity, we will limit our attention to the equilibrium where both gambles are taken. Proofs for the separating
equilibria and no-gamble equilibria are comparable. For both gambles to be taken, the risk premium for each
must be suﬃcient to induce the decision maker to overcome their embarrassment aversion. We are interested
in exactly how large these premia must be. Assuming that the observer expects both gambles to be taken,
Pr[s|xw]=
Pr[s,xw]

























Since, conditional on the outcome, estimated skill is not aﬀected by the gamble’s probability of success
clearly the low probability gamble has a higher risk premium. This is conﬁrmed in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 With performance skill in the both-gamble equilibrium, for p ∈ (0, 1
2) the low probability gamble
(p,xw;1−p,xl) has a larger risk premium than the high probability gamble (1−p,xw;p,xl) when the observer
cannot distinguish between the gambles.
Proof: Since the decision maker does not know her own type and cannot condition her action on her skill,
µr = 1




) − (pv(Pr[s|xw]) + (1 − p)v(Pr[s|xl])). (42)
Comparing,
π(p) − π(1 − p)=( ( 1 − p)v(Pr[s|xw]) + pv(Pr[s|xl])) − (pv(Pr[s|xw]) + (1 − p)v(Pr[s|xl]))
=( 1 − 2p)(v(Pr[s|xw]) − v(Pr[s|xl])) > 0 (43)
where the inequality follows since p<1
2,P r [ s|xw] > Pr[s|xl], and v0 > 0. ¥
We now consider evaluation skill. To permit a more direct comparison with the results when p is known
we will restrict attention to the simplest separating equilibrium where all those with a high signal gamble and
all those with a low signal do not.36 And for the same reasons as before, we also restrict attention to the case
35If the decision maker knows her skill there is asymmetric information in two dimensions — the true odds of the gamble and
the decision maker’s skill — so the analysis is more complicated.
36When the observer does not know the odds there are other separating equilibria of interest, such as the case where only those
facing high odds gamble with a high signal, or only those facing low odds do not gamble with a low signal. The result is the same
and the proofs are similar.
23where the decision maker does not know her own skill. The probability of success given a high signal is
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. (46)
The following proposition conﬁrms that higher probability gambles are favored.
Proposition 6 With evaluation skill in the separating equilibrium, for p ∈ (0, 1
2) the low probability gamble
(p,xw;1−p,xl) has a larger risk premium than the high probability gamble (1−p,xw;p,xl) when the observer
cannot distinguish between the gambles.
The decision maker does not know her own type, so µr = 1












πθ(p) − πθ(1 − p)=
µ
Pr














p [xw|θ])(v(Pr[s|xw,H]) − v(Pr[s|xl,H])) > 0 (48)
where the inequality follows since Pr1−p[xw|θ] > Prp[xw|θ]f o rp<1
2 and since Pr[s|xw] > Pr[s|xl]a n dv0 > 0.
¥
4C o n c l u s i o n
Simple economic models are often poor predictors of human behavior. One approach to this failing is to
investigate whether perceptual or cognitive biases lead to predictable deviations from rational behavior. A
24diﬀerent approach is to consider that many economic models are too simple to capture important strategic and
information eﬀects. In recent decades economists have developed richer models that show how a wide range of
seemingly irrational behaviors may in fact be quite reasonable. For instance, the signaling literature shows how
wasteful displays can paradoxically be individually rational, the folk theorem and reputation literatures show
that cooperative behavior does not require altruism, the career concerns literature shows that people are often
right to ignore the advice of economists and care about sunk costs, the information cascades literature shows
how ineﬃcient herding can arise, and the real options literature shows that refusal to discount the future
according to standard economic formulas is wise under realistic information conditions. This paper shows
that many of the seemingly irrational behaviors identiﬁed with prospect theory may be amenable to similar
reanalysis. In particular, standard models from the career concerns literature appear to oﬀer considerable
insight into the key anomalies of probability weighting, loss aversion, and framing.
Determining whether decision makers are truly biased in their decisions or just act strategically to present
a favorable impression of their skill is important theoretically and is also of practical interest to the many
areas such as ﬁnancial markets, contracting, political science, and the law where prospect theory has been
applied. For instance, a number of papers have found that probability weighting and other predictions of
prospect theory can help explain manager and investor behavior (see Shiller, 1999, and Mullainath and Thaler,
2000, for surveys). An implication of this literature is that principal-agent contracts should be adjusted to
reﬂect predictable, biased choices by the agent. Our analysis of skill signaling supports the more standard
career concerns perspective that contracts should instead be designed in full awareness of agent incentives to
strategically choose their actions so as to manipulate performance information.
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